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The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (the ECT
Act) came into operation on 30 August 2002. Chapter 3 of the Act
recognizes electronic documents, which the ECTAct calls data messages, as
the equivalent of hard-copy documents. This applies for ordinary use (s 11)
and in cases where the law requires writing (s 12). The ECTAct also makes
such records admissible as evidence (s 15). Section 13 provides for advanced
electronic signatures as the equivalent of a written signature where the law
requires this. (At present it is not possible to use an advanced electronic
signature because the Director-General has yet to accredit products and
services to support advanced electronic signatures as required by s 37.)
In practice, of course, people were doing business electronically before the
ECTAct, and electronic documents or data messages had for many purposes
taken the place of written records. The ﬁrst reported South African case
involving the admissibility of electronic evidence, for example, was heard a
quarter of a century before Parliament passed the ECT Act (Narlis v South
African Bank of Athens 1976 (2) SA 573 (A)). It is likely that many South
Africans think electronic records and electronic communications, such as
SMS messages and e-mail, have the same legal weight as hard-copy records
and communications.
Section 4 of the ECT Act, however, expressly excludes some important
transactions from the operation of theAct. This means, in brief, that for these
excluded transactions an electronic document does not satisfy the require-
ment of writing and an advanced electronic signature does not satisfy the
requirement of a signature. Unfortunately, as this note explains, it is not
always clear which are the excluded transactions.
It is possible to show in synoptic form the provisions in the ECTAct that
deal with exclusions:

Schedule 2, item 1 seems intended to achieve the same result. It says the
ECT Act ‘must not be construed as giving validity’ to ‘an agreement for
alienation of immovable property as provided for in the Alienation of Land
Act’. A problem with this formulation is that the Alienation of Land Act
nowhere mentions ‘immovable property’. (The closest it comes is ‘immov-
able asset’ in s 22(4).) There is also a detailed deﬁnition of ‘land’ in s 1 of the
Alienation of LandAct which excludes some forms of property that qualify as
immovable property.
The best way to deal with these difﬁculties is to treat item 1 of Schedule 2
as a poorly drafted and unnecessary repetition of item 2 of Schedule 1. It is
true that when interpreting legislation there is, as Griesel J said in National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Engels 2005 (3) SA 109 (C) para 32, a
‘presumption against redundancy and tautology’. On the other hand,
unnecessary repetition is relatively common in legislative drafting and it is
likely that a court will treat this as such. As Hefer JA said of the Bills of
ExchangeAct 34 of 1964 in Navidas (Pty) Ltd v Essop; Metha v Essop 1994 (4)
SA 141 (A) at 151C-D:
‘I do not profess to know why para (v) was inserted; but tautology is something to which the Legislature
is not unaccustomed and unnecessary provisions are more often than not inserted ex abundanti cautela.’
If the meaning of the exclusion is clear, Franks has questioned the policy it
embodies. Electronic communication is now so much part of modern life that
it seems unreasonable not to recognize an exchange of e-mails or SMS
messages as a binding contract for the sale of land. It is even less reasonable to
refuse to do this if the contracting parties use advanced electronic signatures
(when these become available). (Simone Franks The Capricious Relegation of
Offers to Purchase to Invalid Electronic Transactions by the Electronic Communications
and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (LLM minor dissertation, University of Cape
Town (2004), available at http://lawspace.law.uct.ac; http://hdl.handle.net/2165/
269).)
LONG LEASES
Schedule 2, item 2 says the ECTAct shall not give validity to ‘an agreement
for the long-term lease of immovable property in excess of 20 years as
provided for in the Alienation of Land Act’. There is no equivalent item in
Schedule 1.
The Alienation of Land Act, of course, says nothing about a long lease of
immovable property, or indeed about any other form of lease. What the
drafters of Schedule 2, item 2 may have had in mind was the Formalities in
Respect of Leases of Land Act 18 of 1969. This Act, however, applies to
leases of more than ten years rather than the twenty years mentioned in item
2 of Schedule 2. It may be that a court interpreting the item would make
these substitutions. In S v Tieties 1990 (2) SA 461 (A) at 463F-G, for
example, Smalberger JA referred to what Ward J had said in Skinner v Palmer
1919 WLD 39 at 44:
‘[I]f a proper case arose the Court could delete one word and read in another. But the Court will not
reject a word of clear meaning unless it is forced to do so. If I am forced to the conclusion that the word
‘‘ﬁfty-eight’’ should be read for ‘‘ﬁfty-nine’’ I can so read it.’
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Making the substitutions, however, would not resolve all the problems
with Schedule 2, item 2. Section 1(1) of the Formalities in Respect of Leases
of Land Act is clear that a long lease does not have to be in writing. As
Cooper points out, no lease of land has been invalid merely because it is not
in writing since s 30 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956 (W E
Cooper Landlord and Tenant 2 ed (1994) 69ff). What the Formalities in
Respect of Leases of Land Act does is allow a tenant to have a lease of more
than ten years registered against the title deeds of the leased land, so making
the lease effective against creditors and successors in title. For registration
s 77 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 requires that a long lease be
executed and attested by a notary public. This means, in effect, that until the
Deeds Ofﬁce introduces online registration and the electronic notarization
that s 18(1) of the ECT Act envisages becomes a reality, only a written lease
can be registered. This means that, even making the suggested changes,
Schedule 2, item 2 does not achieve anything.
It is interesting to speculate how far a court interpreting item 2 will go to
give it a meaning. (See the remark by DeVilliers CJ in Ex parte Myburg (1906)
23 SC 668 at 670: ‘So in order to give this Act any intelligible meaning —
and I suppose we must assume that the Legislature did have some meaning in
passing the Act . . .’.) There are two ways to give some meaning to Schedule
2, item 2. One is to treat it as a restatement of the requirements in s 77 of the
Deeds Registries Act. Another is to see it as a prohibition on drawing up any
lease for more than twenty (or ten?) years in the form of an electronic
document.
Both of these interpretations are somewhat forced. It may be that a court
will decide this is one of the cases of last resort in which a legislative provision
must be ignored as a meaningless expression inserted by the drafters by
mistake or, as it is said, per incuriam (see Attorney-General, Transvaal v
Additional Magistrate for Johannesburg 1924 AD 421 and the remarks of
Nicholas AJA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd
1993 (4) SA 110 (A) at 116).
EXECUTING, RETAINING AND PRESENTING A WILL OR
CODICIL
Section 2 of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 says a will and a codicil have to be in
writing, signed and witnessed. Schedule 2, item 3 says the ECT Act ‘must
not be construed as giving validity’ to ‘[t]he execution, retention and
presentation of a will or codicil as deﬁned in the Wills Act’. The reference to
‘execution’means that a will and its signatures have to be in writing. There is
no scope for using data messages and electronic signatures when executing a
will or codicil. Schedule 1, item 1 appears to aim at the same result when it
says that ss 12 and 13 of the ECTAct do not apply to the Wills Act.
Some of the other exclusions in item 1 of Schedule 1 may be unnecessary.
It is unlikely that s 14, dealing with an original, refers to an original
hard-copy document such as a will that is subsequently converted into
electronic form. If this is correct, it is not necessary to exclude ss 16 and 17
NOTES 265
which allow for an electronic document to be retained and produced in
court in electronic form. Not excluded in item 1 of Schedule 1 is s 17, which
allows for producing a document as a data message, although this appears to
go against item 3 of Schedule 2 which excludes the electronic ‘presentation’
of a will. The two could be reconciled by saying that a data message version
of a will can be presented to a public body which requires a copy of a will but
not the original. The data message must, of course, comply with any special
requirements imposed by the public body in terms of s 28 of the ECTAct.
It is even more difﬁcult to see why item 1 of Schedule 1 excludes ss 18–20.
These sections deal with electronic notarization, certiﬁcation and sealing,
electronic service by post, and agreements concluded by automated
electronic transactions and electronic agents. (The signiﬁcance of excluding
s 15, the section that allows electronic evidence, is discussed immediately
below.)
The two formulations agree in insisting on paper, writing and signatures
for wills and codicils. They could, however, be read as giving different
answers to the question whether the exclusion applies to the amendments to
the Wills Act introduced by the Law of Succession Amendment Act 43 of
1992. The 1992 amendment allows a court, subject to certain conditions, to
set aside a will and give effect to later documentary expressions of a testator’s
intention even if these documents do not comply with the formalities for a
will. Chief among these formalities, of course, are writing, signing and
witnessing. Item 3 of Schedule 2, dealing only with executing, retaining and
presenting a will or codicil, does not appear to exclude electronic documents
from qualifying as ‘documentary expressions of a testator’s intention’. Item 1
of Schedule 1, on the other hand, applies to the whole of the Wills Act.
Excluding s 15 of the ECT Act, which makes electronic documents
admissible as evidence, seems to prevent an electronic version of a will or a
draft of a will being used as evidence of a testator’s intention as allowed by
ss 2(3) and 2A of the Wills Act.
It is not easy to say how a court will resolve this conﬂict. In Bekker v Naude
2003 (5) SA 173 (SCA) the court took a narrow view of the powers in s 2(3)
of theWillsAct and insisted on personal drafting. Personal drafting, however,
may be in electronic form and it seems unreasonable to exclude this. In De
Reszke v Maras 2003 (6) SA 676 (C) para 9 Moosa J quoted with approval
from M M Corbett et al The Law of Succession in South Africa 2 ed (2001) 62:
‘It is submitted that it is clear that the person drafts (prepares) a will not only
where such person writes it out in longhand but where such person types it
or puts it on a word processor.’
EXECUTING A BILL OF EXCHANGE
The Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964 deals with bills of exchange, cheques
and promissory notes. These are known as negotiable instruments. The Bills
of Exchange Act requires that bills of exchange, cheques (a cheque being a
bill of exchange to which some special conditions apply) and promissory
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notes should be in writing and signed. A document that does not satisfy these
requirements will not be regulated by the Bills of Exchange Act, although it
may be legally effective in other ways.
Schedule 1, item 3 of the ECTAct says that ss 12 and 13 of the ECTAct,
allowing the use of data messages and electronic signatures when the law
requires writing and signing, do not apply to the Bills of Exchange Act.
Schedule, 2, item 4 says the ECT Act must not be taken to give validity to
executing a bill of exchange. Despite the awkward wording of Schedule 2,
item 4 and the failure of this item to mention cheques and promissory notes,
the combined effect of the two items is that the ECT Act does not allow
electronic bills of exchange.
There are two points to note here. First, it is possible to envisage an
electronic negotiable instrument. One way to do this is outlined in art 17 of
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment of
1996 read with the discussion of this article in paras 110–22 of the Guide.
(Article 17 deals with non-negotiable electronic transport documents and
transferable bills of lading.)
Secondly, although bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes are
negotiable instruments they do not exhaust the list of negotiable instruments.
There are also common-law negotiable instruments such as defence bonds
(see Kahn v Volschenk 1986 (3) SA 84 (A) at 100) and treasury bills (see Secfin
Bank Ltd v Mercantile Bank Ltd 1993 (2) SA 34 (W) at 36–7). The Bills of
Exchange Act does not mention these, and presumably the exclusions in the
ECTAct do not apply to them. In Secfin Bank Ltd (supra) at 35E-F, Goldblatt J
says the basis of a common-law negotiable instrument is custom or trade.
Given that s 12 and 13 of the ECT Act refer to situations where writing and
signature are required by law (not legislation), it should not be necessary to
show an established trade custom to justify recognizing electronic common-
law negotiable instruments.
STAMPING A DOCUMENT
Section 3 of the Stamp Duties Act 77 of 1968 requires that certain listed
instruments or documents be stamped. Failing this, as Waddington J and
LawrenceAJ explained in Buyers Guide (Pty) Ltd v Dada Motors (Mafikeng) Pty
Ltd 1990 (4) SA 55 (B) at 57–9, the transaction the document embodies is
valid but the document cannot be produced in court as evidence until it is
stamped and any penalties for late stamping paid.
Traditionally, someone stamping a document afﬁxes the stamps to the face
of the document and cancels them. This is clearly not possible with an
electronic document, and Schedule 1, item 4 attempts to deal with this
problem. There is no equivalent provision in Schedule 2.
A superﬁcial reading of item 4 is that it does not allow any document that
needs stamping to be in electronic form. What item 4 says, however, is that
ss 11, 12 and 14 of the ECT Act, dealing respectively with the legal
recognition, status as writing and preservation of data messages, do not apply
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to the Stamp Duties Act. But these sections apply only where the law
requires writing, and the Stamp Duties Act, as was the case with the
Formalities in Respect of Leases of Land Act discussed above, does not
require any transaction to be in writing. The Stamp Duties Act says only that
some kinds of writing must be stamped.
The meaning of item 4 is more difﬁcult to decide because the Stamp
Duties Act does in fact allow for stamping in ways that can be used with an
electronic document. Even before the ECTAct, s 3 of the Stamp Duties Act
allowed for stamping a document by receipt. Since the ECTAct, s 74 of the
Revenue LawsAmendmentAct 32 of 2004 amended s 5 of the Stamp Duties
Act to allow for electronic stamping.
The Revenue Laws Amendment Act does not mention the ECT Act. If,
however, there is a conﬂict between s 74 of the Revenue Laws Amendment
Act and item 4 of Schedule 1 to the ECT Act, then s 74, which is the later
and more speciﬁc legislation, should be understood as repealing item 4 by
implication. Whether item 4 prevents anyone from using the procedure in
s 3 of the Stamp Duties Act to stamp an electronic document is not clear.
Finally, it should be noted that item 4 does not deal with stamping required
by other law, such as the Rules of Court.
CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate to have to make such a meal out of the two schedules to the
ECT Act. A simpler drafting style might have made this note unnecessary.
Simpler drafting could also have dealt with the possibility, not previously
discussed in this note, that other legislation recognizes electronic documents
as the equivalent of writing. In Lazurus v Said NO and Roos NO 1958 (3) SA
864 (E) at 868–71, for example, Wynne J said that s 3 of the Interpretation
Act 33 of 1957, ‘Interpretation of expressions relating to writing’, extended
to a tape recording if the tape recording was later used to produce a
typewritten record.
Omitting the unhappy and probably ineffectual attempts to deal with
electronic long leases and electronic stamping, and leaving it to the legislator
to settle whether a court should be allowed to look at an electronic
document in terms of ss 2(3) and 2Aof the Wills Act, the following or similar
language might have expressed the policy behind the exclusions in the ECT
Act:
4 Sphere of application
(3) Data messages and advanced electronic signatures do not satisfy the
requirements of writing and signatures in:
(a) Sections 2, 71 and 87 of the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964;
(b) [Sections 2 and 2A] or [section 2(1) and (2)] of the Wills Act 7 of 1953;
and
(c) Section 3 of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981.
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